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Perceptual Framing of Homeland Security
Linda Kiltz and James D. Ramsay

ABSTRACT

INTRODUCTION

This article analyzes the phenomenon of
homeland security through the development
of four conceptual lenses that were created
out of the existing literatures in criminal
justice, public administration, organization
behavior, risk management, international
relations, and the overlap between them.
Using terrorism as a proxy for the homeland
security enterprise, these conceptual lenses
include: (1) homeland security as a criminal
justice problem which views terrorism as a
crime; (2) homeland security as a
international relations problem which views
terrorism as a war; (3) homeland security
as an organization design problem which
views terrorism as a network of sub-state
transnational actors; and (4) homeland
security as a collaborative nexus which
views terrorism as a complex mixture of
social, political, economic, and
environmental issues; that is, lens 4
represents an overlap of lenses 1-3. Each
conceptual lens consists of theories,
practices, values, beliefs, and assumptions
that serve to shape how homeland security is
conceptualized. We recognize that homeland
security is a broad field applied science that
incorporates natural, technological, and
manmade hazards and threats. Perhaps to
best exemplify the complex and evolving
nature of the homeland security enterprise,
terrorism can be an effective proxy for how
homeland security might be conceptualized
and how a theoretical foundation might be
structured. These conceptual lenses highlight
how perceptual filters can significantly alter
how individuals and organizations
understand and explain phenomena or
events.

We see the world, not as it is, but as we are—
or, as we are conditioned to see it.
- Steven R. Covey in The 7 Habits of Highly
Effective People
Surprise occurs the moment we realize our
view of the world no longer matches reality.
- Wayne Burkan in Wide Angle Vision
“Would you tell me, please, which way I
ought to go from here?” “That depends a
good deal on where you want to get to,” said
the Cat. “I don’t much care where,” said
Alice. “Then it doesn’t matter which way you
go,” said the Cat. “So long as I get
SOMEWHERE,” Alice added as an
explanation. “Oh, you’re sure to do that,”
said the Cat, “if you only walk long enough.”
- From Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland, by Lewis Carroll
At 8:46 a.m. on September 11, 2001,
American Airlines flight 11 crashed into the
North Tower of the World Trade Center in
New York City. Initial reports by the media
stated that an airplane had crashed into one
of the towers in what to many appeared to be
an accident of some kind. 1 This belief was
supported by eyewitness accounts that
described the airplane to news reporters as a
small commuter plane or “a smaller plane.” 2
Sean Murtagh, a CNN producer, stated
minutes after the attack, “I just witnessed a
plane that appeared to be cruising at slightly
lower-than-normal altitude over New York
City, and it appears to have crashed into – I
don't know which tower it is – but it hit
directly in the middle of one of the World
Trade Center towers.” 3 When Murtagh was
asked about the type of aircraft he reported it
was a “two engine jet, maybe a 737…a large
passenger commercial jet.” 4 In attempting to
explain what was happening from an accident
narrative, the CNN reporter asked Murtagh if
the plane had difficulty flying in which he
responded, “Yes, it did. It was teetering back
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and forth, wingtip to wingtip, and it looks like
it crashed into, probably, twenty stories from
the top of the World Trade Center.” 5
President Bush also reported that he thought
the initial crash was an accident: “I was
sitting outside the classroom waiting to go in,
and I saw an airplane hit the tower – the TV
was obviously on, and I use to fly myself, and
I said, "There's one terrible pilot." And I said,
"It must have been a horrible accident."6
The idea that this event could have been a
terrorist attack was not evident in the initial
news reports of the 9/11 attacks, even though
in 1993 Ramzi Yousef, a nephew of Khalid
Sheik Mohammad (the mastermind behind
the 9/11 attacks) and six co-conspirators had
detonated a 1,500 pound bomb in the
underground parking garage of the World
Trade Center that killed six people and
injured more than 1,000. 7 The goal of this
attack was to devastate the foundation of the
north tower in such a way that it would
collapse onto its twin, thus causing the
collapse of both. 8 As a nation we initially did
not perceive that we were under attack by al
Qaeda although this organization was
responsible for carrying out a number of
highly destructive suicide bombing attacks
against the United States before 9/11
including the 1998 attacks against the
American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and the attack on
the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen on
October 12, 2000. This perception rapidly
changed, however, when United Airlines
Flight 175 struck the South Tower of the
World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m. on
September 11, 2001.
Immediately after the second airplane
crashed into the WTC, reporters on ABC, Fox,
and NBC news began talking about a
deliberate attack. Charles Gibson of Good
Morning America stated, “It looks like a
concerted effort to attack the World Trade
Center in New York… A concerted attack is
underway.” 9 One of the first witnesses of the
event interviewed by CNN reported, “I
believe it was intentional. It was flown
deliberately into the building… There was
nothing wrong with the airplane.” 10 President
Bush reported that when he was told that a
second plane had hit the World Trade Center,
“I knew that when I got all the facts that we
were under attack, there would be hell to pay
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for attacking America.” 11 By evening on
September 11, 2001 the shock and surprise
turned to anger as Americans realized that
America was under attack.
On that day, nineteen men affiliated with
al Qaeda, an Islamic terrorist organization,
hijacked a total of four passenger jets. 12 Two
of these planes crashed into the World Trade
Center, one airplane crashed into the
Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia
killing 184 people, and the last aircraft
crashed into a field near the town of
Shanksville in rural Somerset County,
Pennsylvania as passengers and members of
the flight crew attempted to retake control of
their plane from the hijackers. Excluding the
nineteen hijackers, a confirmed 2,973 people
died and thousands were injured as a result
of these attacks. 13
Since the 2001 attacks, the term homeland
security has been used regularly in the media
and in our daily lexicon. Our “war on
terrorism” has had a significant impact on US
domestic and foreign policies and on the lives
of people throughout the world. Fear of
future terrorist attacks has spawned the
development and creation of massive
governmental programs, agencies, and
policies aimed at protecting our homeland.
For example, at the federal level, a massive
reorganization merged twenty-two distinct
federal agencies into the Department of
Homeland Security; this was the largest
restructuring of the federal bureaucracy in
fifty years. 14 It is clear that homeland security
has been a prominent public policy focus
since September 11, 2001 in part because
overwhelming government response was
needed to protect the United States from
future terrorist attacks, and because political
and public expectations made it so.
DEFINING HOMELAND SECURITY
Though the term homeland security is
used in our common language on a regular
basis, a review of the literature shows that
there is no consensus on the meaning of
homeland security. A frequently cited
definition of homeland security is from the
2002 National Strategy for Homeland
Security. The federal government defined
homeland security as “a concerted national
effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the
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United States, reduce America’s vulnerability
to terrorism, and minimizing the damage and
recover from attacks that do occur.” 15 This
definition has been expanded under
President Barak Obama to include other
hazards after the catastrophic events of
Hurricane Katrina. The Obama
administration's current strategy focuses on
terrorism as the foremost of many threats,
defining homeland security as "a concerted
national effort to ensure a homeland that is
safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism
and other hazards, where American interests,
aspirations, and way of life can thrive."16 The
most current federal definition of homeland
security reflects much of what the nation has
learned about homeland security policy,
strategy, and tactics over the last decade. It
arises from the February 2010 Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review (QHSR) which
refers to homeland security as an enterprise,
or an inherently collaborative and joint effort
of federal, state, local, tribal, private sector,
and nongovernmental partners with a
common interest in the well being and public
safety of America. The QHSR states:
Homeland security describes the
intersection of evolving threats and hazards
with traditional governmental and civic
responsibilities for civil defense, emergency
response, law enforcement, customs,
border control, and immigration. In
combining these responsibilities under one
overarching concept, homeland security
breaks down longstanding stovepipes of
activity that have been and could still be
exploited by those seeking to harm
America. 17

The conceptual lenses in this article were
developed because there is no coherent
theory to date that explains the phenomenon
of homeland security and are built on the
assumption that the primary focus of
homeland security is on the threat of
terrorism versus natural hazards. 18 One
method that can be used to begin to build a
theory of homeland security is to adapt and
blend applicable theories from a number of
academic disciplines that have relevance to
homeland security issues and challenges.
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center in 1993 and in 2001 and our
government’s response have been explained
in part by theories from the fields of political
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science, criminal justice, public
administration, sociology, and others.
However, each of these discipline-specific
theories and their corresponding paradigms
offer but a piece of the picture in
understanding homeland security policy and
the threat of terrorism as a social and
political phenomenon. The purpose of this
article is to gain a better understanding of
homeland security by looking at this
phenomenon through multiple conceptual
lenses or paradigms.
Paradigms are “a set of assumptions,
concepts, values and practices that
constitutes a way of viewing reality for the
community that shares them,” especially in
an academic discipline. 19 A paradigm shapes
how we see the world and helps to explain the
world to us. Paradigms are like internal maps
that we carry with us in our brains, often
subconsciously, in the form of images,
assumptions, stories, theories, and principles,
that condition how we perceive the world,
make judgments, and solve problems. 20 Our
paradigms are formed not only by our early
experiences as children within our families
and communities, but also through our
educational experiences and training. More
importantly, paradigms heavily influence
how we see current events as well as whether
we will be aware of new problems, how we
perceive and understand new phenomenon,
and how we choose to solve problems.
For example, immediately following the
events of 9/11, homeland security was largely
viewed as a series of efforts designed to
counter terrorism. For example, President
Bush declared that “homeland security
encompasses those activities that are focused
on combating terrorism… Such activities
include efforts to detect, deter, protect
against and, if needed, respond to terrorist
attacks.” 21 Given the above statement, what
first comes to mind when you read the term
deter? What is meant by the concept of
deterrence as it relates to terrorism? A law
enforcement officer or a scholar in
criminology would mostly likely have very
different definitions and theories of
deterrence than someone who works in the
military or a scholar in international relations
or risk management.
For criminologists, deterrence occurs
when someone refrains from committing a
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crime because he fears the certainty,
swiftness, and severity of legal punishment. 22
Deterrence from an international relations
perspective, on the other hand, refers to a
policy aimed at dissuading an adversary
(usually a nation state) from using military
force to achieve its foreign policy objectives
through the threat of military retaliation. 23 A
risk management perspective of deterrence
might include the effects of failed control
procedures, including the relative inability to
safeguard assets or to ensure accurate
reporting. If we take the term deterrence
from criminology, we would assume that we
are going to deter terrorism by passing new
legislation raising the penalties for specific
criminal acts that may be defined as
terrorism. However, if we use the theories of
deterrence from an international relations
perspective, we would assume either covert
intelligence operations or military action
would be used against terrorist threats. Both
of these uses of deterrence pose unique policy
solutions that may not be effective against
some forms of terrorism we are likely to face
in the future.

BUILDING A THEORY OF
HOMELAND SECURITY USING
MULTIPLE FRAME ANALYSIS
In order to understand the challenges in
developing homeland security theory, it is
critical to incorporate the complex and
dynamic nature of the homeland security
enterprise. However, rather than trying to
understand each of the many challenging
issues characterizing homeland security at
the same time, it is logical to simplify the task
by concentrating on a single challenge. For
this article, we choose the challenge of
terrorism. In turn, three perspectives, or
conceptual lenses, are identified from the
literature that can each be used
independently, or in combination, to
understand the problem of terrorism. The
lenses derive from the criminology and
criminal justice literature, the international
relations literature, and the public
administration and political science
literature. Each conceptual lens in multiple
frame analysis consists of theories, practices,
values, beliefs, and assumptions that serve to
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shape how the threat of terrorism is
perceived as a problem, and how the problem
should be resolved in the form of homeland
security policy and programs. These
conceptual lenses highlight how perceptual
filters can significantly alter how individuals
and organizations understand and explain
phenomena or events. The first lens, criminal
justice, views terrorism (the proxy for
homeland security) as a criminal justice
problem. The second lens views terrorism as
an international relations issue. The third
lens views terrorism as an organization
design problem. In addition, a fourth lens is
described. The overlap of the previous three
lenses suggests that the homeland security
enterprise might also be understood as a
collaborative nexus of each of the other
viewpoints. This article will describe the
characteristics and assumptions of each of
these conceptual lenses based on a
comprehensive literature review and their
subsequent application to homeland security
as described in the 2002 National Strategy
for Homeland Security. In addition, this
article will demonstrate that although each
lens has a distinct contribution to what
homeland security is, each of the lenses work
together on many issues and challenges of
homeland security as a collaborative nexus of
methods and strategies. Hence where the
three lenses overlap offers a distinct
contribution to what homeland security is as
well.
The article is organized as follows. Part
One describes the characteristics of the first
lens, homeland security as a criminal justice
problem, viewing terrorism as a crime. Part
Two describes the second lens, homeland
security as an international relations
problem, viewing terrorism as war. Part
Three describes the third lens, homeland
security as an organization design problem
that views terrorism as a network. The
characteristics of each lens are based on
those items most frequently represented in
the literature. However, there is no one
paradigm or clear consensus in the academic
disciplines on how the entirety of homeland
security is understood, and therefore what
homeland security policies might be most
effective against the threat of terrorism.
Scholars and practitioners in criminal
justice, international relations, and public
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administration bring different educational
backgrounds, experiences, values, and beliefs
to their study of historical events and new
phenomena. Thus, these individuals may see
completely different things when they look at
the same events. 24 (See figure 1.) Joel Barker
wrote, “What may be perfectly clear and
visible to one person is invisible to another
because of differing paradigms.” 25 As a
caution, the authors note that viewing the
world through a given conceptual lens is like
looking at a distant object through a straw;
while it allows a person to focus on one
specific aspect of an issue, the nature of the
perspective tends to oversimplify complex
issues by blocking out the larger view.
Similarly, it may also block the viewer’s
ability to look at the event from an alternative
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vantage point. Ultimately, given the complex
and dynamic nature of the homeland security
enterprise, if we are to understand it we must
find a way to consider homeland security
issues and challenges, like terrorism, from
multiple perspectives. Additionally, we have
to have the ability to put our own (perhaps
preferred) perspective aside so we can
understand homeland security from a variety
of points of view. Thus, to form a theoretical
foundation of homeland security, we will use
multiple perspectives, or lenses, to consider
the challenge of terrorism. Each conceptual
lens will be described distinct theories,
definitions, meanings, and strategies. (See
Figure 1.)

Figure 1: Multiple Frame Analysis
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LENS I: HOMELAND SECURITY AS A
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROBLEM –
TERRORISM IS VIEWED AS A CRIME
By looking at terrorism as crime and through
a criminal justice lens, key characteristics of
homeland security and terrorism are
highlighted. First, the criminal justice lens
perceives terrorism as a crime that is
politically motivated. Theodore Honderich
defines political violence as:
[The] use of force against persons or things;
a use of force prohibited by law, directed to
a change in the policies, system, territory of
jurisdiction, or personnel of a government
or governments, and hence also directed to
changes in the lives of individuals within
societies. 26

Unlike other offenders investigated by the
FBI, those identified as terrorists have
committed or are suspected of having
committed crimes for political reasons.
However despite the motivation, acts of
terrorism can include crimes such as murder,
kidnapping, arson, and destruction of
property which are acts designated to be
illegal by state and national criminal codes.
Second, terrorism is defined as an act of
violence whose purpose is to coerce or
intimidate a government or population to
obtain political or social benefits. 27 For
example the federal statutes on terrorism
define international and domestic terrorism
as:
Activities that involve violent acts or acts
dangerous to human life that are a violation
of the criminal laws of the U.S. or of any
state, and appear intended to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population; to influence
the policy of a government by intimidation
or coercion; or attempt to affect the
conduct of government by mass
destruction, assassination or kidnapping.28

What distinguishes acts of terrorism from
common crimes is that the act is motivated
by political, ideological, and religious intent
in order to create a mood of fear and that the
victims are always innocent.
Third, terrorism is distinct from ordinary
domestic crime in a number of ways.
Criminals are characterized as opportunistic,
impulsive, self-centered, and undisciplined. 29
For most criminals, crime is a way for
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obtaining goods and violence is employed as
a means to obtain money or material goods
for the criminal’s own self-interest.
Terrorists, by contrast, normally plan their
operations and their violent acts are intended
to have consequences (political or social) and
make a symbolic statement about a political
cause. 30 In addition, terrorists are motivated
by ideology, while criminals are generally not
committed to any specific ideology. Finally,
most criminals avoid committing crimes in
public and are oriented toward escape.
Terrorists, however, use political violence to
gain public attention for their cause; they
train and prepare for their missions, and are
attack oriented. 31
Fourth, counter terrorism strategies to
prevent and deter terrorism can be found in
part in crime prevention and deterrence
theories. A primary purpose of criminal law is
to deter or to dissuade a person from
committing a crime because he/she fears
being punished through fines or
incarceration. Deterrence theory from the
perspective of criminologists assumes that
individuals are rational actors who choose to
obey or violate the law by a rational
calculation of the risk of pain from
incarceration, social stigma, or death penalty
versus the potential pleasure and economic
gain derived from a criminal act. 32 Homeland
security policy since 9/11 has included
activities focused on deterring terrorism by
passing legislation (i.e., PATRIOT Act) that
created new terrorism related crimes, such as
acts of violence against mass transportation
systems, and made penalties more severe for
those convicted of such crimes. 33 The primary
weakness of using legal sanctions as a
deterrent to terrorism is that the actual or
perceived threat of formally applied
punishment by the state has not been proven
to provide a significant marginal deterrent
effect as it does with criminals. 34 And, in
addition, the challenge presented by
asymmetric transnational actors is that they
are difficult to prosecute by US law. This
point is made more significant given the
inability to form coherent international
bodies, policies, and laws that have
reasonable potential to be enforced so as to
be able to deter anything. Take for example
the problem Somali pirates pose to the
international shipping community.
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Law enforcement agencies often employ
crime prevention strategies to complement
deterrence strategies. Among the most visible
crime prevention measures are those that
include various forms of target hardening and
increasing the physical security of potential
targets of crime. Target hardening includes
the installation of locks, bars for windows,
intruder alarms, fences, and other devices
that make crime more difficult to carry out.
Other situational crime prevention strategies
include physical, electronic, and procedural
measures that serve to deter criminals from
attacking, detecting them if they do attack,
delaying them so they can be apprehended,
and denying them access to certain targets. 35
These types of measures were clearly seen
after 9/11 at airports, government buildings,
and port facilities where new fences,
barricades, scanners, and surveillance
systems were adopted.
Lastly, the criminal justice lens identifies
homeland security as a criminal justice
problem that should be handled by local,
state, national, and international law
enforcement agencies. Law enforcement
agencies are concerned with preventing and
deterring crime, gathering evidence,
determining the guilt of the individuals
responsible for a particular act, and
apprehending and bringing the perpetrators
to trial. The criminal justice approach offers a
broad range of counterterrorist strategies to
deter, prevent, and respond to terrorism that
is quite different from an international
relations and organizational design
perspective. Because acts of terrorism are
inherently criminal behaviors under the laws
of the nation and states, local and state law
enforcement agencies play a major role in
counter terrorism. In many state and local
homeland security plans, law enforcement
agencies are assigned tasks that include
gathering intelligence and sharing
information through joint terrorism task
forces, protecting key infrastructure and
assets, doing surveillance and preventive
patrols, responding to bomb threats and
other disasters, and conducting
investigations. 36
The contemporary criminal justice system
in the United States has played a key role in
homeland security when terrorism has been
perceived as a crime, because all parts of the
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criminal justice system are activated when an
individual or group commits an act of
terrorism within the United States and they
are caught, prosecuted, and found guilty of
the crimes. The criminal justice system
consists of three main components: law
enforcement agencies charged with
investigating crimes and apprehending
suspects; the court system where a
determination is made whether a suspect is
guilty as charged; and the correctional system
charged with treating and rehabilitating
offenders and with incapacitating them.
In the criminal justice lens, local, state,
and federal law enforcement agencies play a
critical role in homeland security. At the
national level, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) has been designated the
lead federal agency in investigating terrorist
groups in the United States and acts of
terrorism directed at Americans overseas.
The FBI received this authority through a
series of presidential directives and
legislation including President Reagan’s
national security decision directive 30, 37 the
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and
Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 38 and President
Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 39. 39
Although the FBI has had this role for over
twenty years, throughout most of the 1990s
counterterrorism was not seen as the priority
in this organization. Before 9/11, the highest
priority goal for the FBI was the reduction of
violent crime, including organized crime and
drug and gang related violence. 40 However
since the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the highest
priority for the department has been to
protect Americans by preventing acts of
terrorism. 41
The International Association of Chiefs of
Police (IACP) argue that all “terrorism is
local” and that regardless of the global and
international connections, any actual
terrorism attack is going to occur at the local
level and it will be local first responders who
will initially deal with the attack. 42 As first
responders to a terrorist attack, local police
officers will be responsible for assessing the
crime scene for hazards, calling for and
providing medical assistance, identifying
victims and witnesses, securing the crime
scene and physical evidence, and notifying
supervisors and investigators who will be
handling the case. 43 In addition to
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responding to and investigating terrorist
attacks after they occur, local police are
required to be more proactive in preventing
and detecting acts of terrorism through
intelligence gathering and analysis and by
completing threat and vulnerability
assessments in their jurisdictions. 44 From the
criminal justice perspective, terrorism is
considered a criminal matter to be handled
by local, state, and national law enforcement
agencies. Law enforcement is concerned with
gathering evidence, determining the guilt of
the individuals responsible for a particular
act, and apprehending and bringing the
perpetrators to trial.
Criminal justice is not only viewed in the
United States as a system, but also as a
process that takes offenders through a series
of decision points beginning with the
investigation of a crime and arrest of
suspects, to adjudication where guilt or
innocence is determined in a trial, and
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concluding with correctional treatment and
release. 45 While the actual process is more
complex than this and can vary based on if
the crimes are classified as misdemeanors or
felonies, what is critical about this process is
that it is bound by specific constitutional
procedures and protections. The formal
justice process implies that criminal
defendants charged with a serious crime are
entitled to a full range of rights under the law
including the right to refuse to answer
questions when placed in police custody, the
right to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury, and the right to have trial
procedures subject to review by a higher
authority, to name a few. This lens identifies
homeland security as a criminal justice
problem that is best resolved by utilizing the
institutions and processes of the criminal
justice system (see Table 1 for a summary).

Table 1: Characteristics of Lens I – Terrorism as a Criminal Justice Problem
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LENS II: HOMELAND SECURITY AS AN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROBLEM
–TERRORISM IS VIEWED AS A WAR
This lens conceptualizes terrorism as a form
of warfare and is grounded in an
international relations foundation, thus
presenting key characteristics that are
distinct from the other lenses. First,
homeland security is linked to national
security in protecting the United States and
its interests at home and abroad. In the wake
of the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, the United States required a guiding
vision to outline our national strategy to
combat the terrorist threat at home and
abroad. Under President George W. Bush five
new strategies were published, 46 relating to
specific aspects of homeland security and
combating terrorism, in addition to an
updated National Security Strategy.
Although there are many definitions of
national security, the US armed forces
defines national security as a:
…collective term encompassing both
national defense and foreign relations of
the United States. Specifically, the
condition provided by: 1) a military or
defense advantage over any foreign nation
or group of nations; 2) a favorable foreign
relations position; or 3) a defense posture
capable of successfully resisting hostile or
destructive action from within or without,
overt or covert.47

While national security is typically
considered the purview of the military
referring to the aggregate of foreign and
domestic security issues facing America,
homeland security might best be considered a
civilian function. In policy and practice, the
homeland security enterprise includes the
combined domestic efforts of federal, state,
local, and private organizations focused on, at
a minimum, preventing, deterring, and
responding to acts of terrorism within the
homeland as well as efforts to harden and
protect critical infrastructure, efforts to
improve emergency planning, response and
recovery, intelligence gathering and
disseminating, and policy development that
supports all these efforts.

9

The 2002 National Security Strategy
provides a broad framework for
strengthening US security in the future. It
also identifies the national security goals of
the United States, and describes the foreign
policy and military capabilities necessary to
achieve those goals. These goals included
combating terrorism around the world by
disrupting and destroying of these
organizations, strengthening homeland
security, and fostering cooperation with allies
and international organizations to combat
terror. 48
This link between homeland security and
national security is also highlighted in
President Obama’s National Security
Strategy, 2010 (NSS). One of the significant
differences between the 2002 and 2010
national security strategies was President
Obama’s decision to merge the concepts of
national security and homeland security
more closely as well as to abandon the
doctrine of pre-emption. Obama argued that
the 2010 NSS complemented “our efforts to
integrate homeland security with national
security, including seamless coordination
among Federal, state and local governments
to prevent, protect against, and respond to
threats and natural disasters.” 49 Among the
major objectives of the 2010 NSS are to
prevent terrorist attacks on and in the United
States through the use of intelligence, law
enforcement, and homeland security
capabilities, and to disrupt, dismantle, and
defeat al Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the
world. 50 The concept of defeating global
terrorist networks and insurgencies is
supported by military and international
relations theories that view terrorism as a
form of asymmetrical warfare, which is the
next component of the international relations
lens.
Second, seen through this lens, terrorism
is perceived as a strategy of asymmetrical
warfare that is directed at people, particularly
civilians and noncombatants, in violation of
the laws of war. 51 This perception is clearly
articulated by President Bush in the National
Security Strategy of 2002, in which he states,
“The United States is fighting a war against
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terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a
single political regime or person or religion or
ideology. The enemy is terrorism —
premeditated, politically motivated violence
against innocents.” 52 Terrorism from this
perspective is an act of violence the purpose
of which is it to coerce or intimidate a
government or population in order to obtain
primarily political goals but the violence is
perpetrated using asymmetric methods and
strategies.
Presumably, most transnational terrorist
organizations realize they are much smaller
and weaker than national armies and cannot
fight and win the more powerful side under
conventional rules of war. 53 This indeed is the
heart of the asymmetry between traditional
military power and modern terrorist
organizations such as al Qaeda or Hamas.
Thus, the weaker terrorist organization uses
unconventional methods of fighting, such as
the use of car bombs and suicide bombers
against civilian targets, assassination of
political leaders, attacks against information
systems and critical infrastructure, and
environmental destruction. 54 The attacks by
al Qaeda on September 11, 2001 revealed how
unconventional (asymmetric) strategies can
be effectively used to inflict mass casualties,
and have tremendous political, social and
psychological effects.
A third element of this lens is that
terrorism is a form of psychological warfare
that targets civilians as a means of instilling
fear in a population. Wheeler writes,
“terrorism, a psychological technique relying
on the effects of surprise and shock to
unnerve or to coerce, aims at an opponent’s
eventual demoralization and surrender on
the issue in dispute.” 55 By brutal acts against
civilians, terrorists seek to sow fear in a
population as a whole in the hope that this
will destabilize the society and alienate
people from support of their government. 56
Fourth, this lens recognizes that terrorism
is perpetrated by individuals, domestic and
transnational groups, and agents of nationstates. Of particular concern is state
sponsored terrorism and its impact on the
world system. 57 International relations
scholars have written extensively about how
terrorism can be used as a tool of foreign
policy by nation states as a means of
balancing power in the world system, of
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destabilizing hostile regimes, and of avoiding
direct military confrontation with a more
powerful nation state. 58 A weaker nation state
and transnational organizations will use
terrorism as a foreign policy strategy over
conventional warfare because conventional
warfare will simply be too costly in terms of
personnel and resources. This was clearly
seen during the Cold War where the former
Soviet Union was involved with a wide range
of terrorist movements throughout the world
that attempted to destabilize and embarrass
the United States and our allies. 59 The
behavior of the former Soviet Union, Iran,
and other nation-states as state sponsors of
terrorism, as well as the behavior of
transnational terrorist organizations, can be
explained in part by a wide range of
international relations theories60
Within a month of the 9/11 attacks the
United States launched a large-scale military
operation in Afghanistan to overthrow the
Taliban regime harboring al Qaeda, to find
Osama bin Laden, and to defeat terrorist
elements in the country. President Bush
warned that the United States would not just
respond after being attacked in the future,
but would exercise the right to self defense by
acting preemptively against terrorist
organizations to prevent them from doing
harm against our nation. 61 The doctrine of
preemption – of attacking an enemy based on
legitimate evidence that an attack is
imminent – replaced deterrence as a key
principle of US foreign policy under the Bush,
Reagan, and Clinton administrations.
The doctrine of deterrence has been a key
principle of US foreign policy since the 1950s.
In its most general form, deterrence is
defined as the power to persuade one’s
opponents that the costs and/or risks of a
given course of action outweigh its benefits. 62
Thus, an adversary can be deterred by the
threatened use of military force, as well as by
other types of threats/rewards that can
include economic or trade sanctions or the
promise of economic aid. To be a credible
deterrent against possible threats, the United
States must not only maintain a stable
deterrent posture by having a readiness to
use military force when needed, but also
must be able to convince an adversary that
we have the will and power to punish an
adversary severely. 63 Many scholars have

HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 15 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG

KILTZ & RAMSAY, PERCEPTUAL FRAMING OF HS

noted that in the 1980s and 1990s, US foreign
policy failed to deter terrorist attacks because
we failed to communicate to groups such as al
Qaeda that the United States was willing and
able to inflict significant damage on their
organizations in the event of an attack. 64 In
fact prior to 9/11, the United States had
consistently failed to retaliate in any
meaningful manner against terrorist attacks
by Islamic radicals such as those against the
World Trade Center in 1993, the US
embassies in East Africa in 1998, and the USS
Cole in Yemen in 2000. A primary weakness
of deterrence theories in international
relations is that many are directed against
nation states, not individuals or transnational
terrorist organizations, which are today
primarily sub state actors.
In the realm of international relations,
globalization has had a significant impact on
actors in the world system. Globalization is a
dynamic process that has involved the
integration of economic markets, nationstates, and technologies, and has made the
transnational movement of money, goods,
people, and ideas much easier to
accomplish. 65 As a result, extensive webs of
interdependence have been created that have
had negative and positive impacts on the
world system. Among the negative aspects is
the anti-globalization backlash that has
arisen in some regions of the world. A
number of scholars have argued that the
increased threat of transnational terrorism in
the post Cold War era can be explained in
part by organizations and communities
fighting against globalization and the spread
of American political, economic, and cultural
influence. 66 For example, Samuel Huntington
in The Clash of Civilizations, argued that the
spread of western influence militarily,
economically, politically, socially, and
culturally has created intense resentment
among Muslims and this will result in future
conflicts. 67 Further, Benjamin Barber also
argues that terrorism is a reaction to the
international forces of globalization because
it threatens traditional community structures
based on kinship, religion, or ethnicity. 68
According to economist Joseph Stiglitz, anti
globalization attitudes in developing
countries are due to the fact that
globalization has made some of these
countries worse off than before, including
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those in the Muslim world. 69 In the Muslim
world, globalization has not only been seen as
a force that is undermining traditional values,
but also as a source of economic exploitation
by the West, particularly the United States. 70
To kindle the anger and frustration of the
population and recruit members to their
ranks, radical elements within these societies,
such as Hamas or al Qaeda, make claims that
wealthy nations are exploiting them to gain
more power and wealth at the expense of
weaker nation states and communities. Thus,
terrorist violence by groups and individuals
may be the result of feelings of intense anger,
aggression and frustration due to
environmental conditions such as
globalization, deprivation or oppression. 71
Finally, the international relations lens
views terrorism as a form of warfare that is
an international relations problem that
should be handled by national intelligence
agencies, the State Department, the National
Security Council, and the United States
military. Wherein homeland security issues
are involved, these agencies are focused on
the national security of the United States and
are concerned with preventing, deterring,
and responding to international terrorism
through a broad range of offensive and
defensive counterterrorism strategies.
Terrorism experts often organize
counterterrorist options into three
classifications that include: (1) diplomacy,
financial controls, military force, intelligence,
and covert actions; (2) legal, repressive, and
conciliatory responses to terrorism; and (3)
targeted and untargeted prevention (i.e.,
target hardening). 72 Counterterrorism
options can vary from the use of military
force and intelligence operations to
diplomacy and social reforms. Military forces
are deployed in covert operations using
special operations forces, in suppression
campaigns using military strikes to destroy or
disrupt terrorist personnel and
infrastructure, and in preemptive attacks to
prevent terrorist attacks in the future. For
example, the United States responded to
terrorist acts of aggression with military
operations in Afghanistan in response to
9/11/01 as well as in Libya after the Berlin
Disco bombing in 1986. 73
Nonmilitary, repressive options include
nonviolent covert operations such as
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disinformation campaigns, intelligence
gathering and analysis, economic sanctions,
and enhanced physical security of possible
targets or target hardening. Conciliatory
counterterrorism options do not involve the
use of force or other repressive methods and
can include diplomacy to negotiate
acceptable resolutions to a conflict, and social
reforms to address the root causes of
terrorism. 74
Legal responses to terrorism
include actions, such as economic or trade
sanctions instituted by international
organizations such as the United Nations and
World Court.
Each of these options has been used by
various administrations to prevent, deter,

12

and respond to terrorism, but some of these
options can pose significant ethical and legal
d i l e m m a s f o r p o l i c y m a k e r s . 75 T h e
importance of preemption and deterrence in
preventing terrorist attacks by transnational
terrorist organizations and nation states is
central to the development of these responses
when viewed through the international
relations lens. 76 Regarding terrorism and
counter-terrorism, this lens views homeland
security as an international relations problem
that is best addressed by utilizing the
institutions and processes of the US national
security apparatus (See Table 2 for
Summary.)

Table 2: Characteristics of Lens II – Terrorism as War
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LENS III: HOMELAND SECURITY AS AN
ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN PROBLEM –
TERRORISM IS VIEWED AS A NETWORK
OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
In Lens III – Homeland Security as an
Organizational Design Problem/Terrorism as
Network – a number of characteristics are
highlighted. This lens views homeland
security from an organizational design and
public administration perspective. First, this
lens focuses on the importance of the design
and structure of the government
organizations tasked with homeland security
and counter-terrorism. The argument is that
rational, hierarchical, bureaucratic designs
and practices are likely to face significant
challenges in deterring, preventing, and
responding to terrorism attacks in the future
because they are not well suited for operating
in complex, unstable environments. Yet in
the wake of 9/11, passage of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 created one of the
largest bureaucratic organizations in
Washington, DC. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) was created to
centralize the resources and expertise of
twenty-two diverse federal agencies into a
supra-bureaucracy ostensibly in order to
achieve greater coordination in homeland
security within federal agencies and with
state and local government and the private
sector.
How best to accomplish homeland
security is one of most complex problems
that must be addressed by our elected leaders
and government organizations at the local,
state, and federal levels. The coordinated
execution of agreed upon programs and
policies in homeland security is
fundamentally the responsibility of not only
DHS, but also for a vast network of
government agencies, nonprofit
organizations, and private enterprises
working in a concerted effort to prevent,
deter, and respond to terrorist attacks within
the United States. Though a network of
organizations is involved in these homeland
security efforts, the primary structure of
government organizations is a hierarchical
model with bureaucratic organizational
structures. 77 Bureaucratic structures are often
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described as having a clear hierarchy in
which there is supervision of lower offices by
higher ones, a clear chain of command and
authority, established rules, policies and
procedures (red tape), a division of work, and
clear lines of communication which is best
suited for stable and predictable work
environments. 78 However, organizations
dedicated to homeland security often operate
in environments that are dynamic, complex,
and uncertain, thus requiring an organic
network structure that is highly
decentralized, flexible, and adaptable. 79 The
large-scale failure of the federal government
in responding to Hurricane Katrina in 2005
clearly highlighted the coordination
challenges faced by traditionally bureaucratic
organizations.
A number of public administration
scholars argue that network governance
structures are the most effective in
responding to increasingly complex social
and political problems that span across
organizations and levels of government. 80
Network models of organizations and
governance are significantly different than
hierarchical models. 81 First, while hierarchies
have a single authority structure created
under a chain of command, networks have a
divided authority structure. Second, in a
hierarchical structure activities are guided by
clear goals and well-defined problems, while
in a network there are various and changing
definitions of problems and goals. Third, a
network is a highly organic structure that is
decentralized and may integrate multiple
levels of government and a variety of private
and nonprofit organizations in order to
deliver a service or meet policy goals. One of
the greatest strengths of a network structure
is its ability to bring together a group of
experts and resources to solve problems in a
rapidly changing and shifting environment.
These capabilities are critical in preventing,
deterring, and responding to the vast array of
threats to the homeland. Homeland security
is a shared responsibility with Congress, state
and local governments, the private sector,
nonprofit organizations, and the American
people. To effectively integrate and
coordinate these diverse stakeholders into
homeland security efforts, network
governance structures (i.e., fusion centers,
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interagency policy centers, multinational law
enforcement, and data sharing Memos of
Understanding, etc.) will need to be created
and maintained at multiple levels.
The next element of this lens focuses on
the organizational culture, mission, and
strategies of the agencies involved in
homeland security. How terrorism, as well as
other threats, is defined and conceptualized
is determined largely by the lead agencies
involved in homeland security, particularly
the Department of Homeland Security,
Department of Justice, Department of
Defense, and the organizations associated
with national intelligence and national
security. As a result, counterterrorism
policies and programs will take on the
character of these organizations. For
example, the FBI has historically taken a
traditional law enforcement approach to
counter terrorism whereby agents respond to
crimes after they have occurred to gather
evidence and build a case for prosecution
(this was clearly seen in their handling of the
1993 World Trade Center bombing). But
following 9/11 and the subsequent passage of
the PATRIOT Act, the FBI has attempted to
become more proactive.
Strategy is often driven by policy, which is
in turn driven by world events. Strategic
responses to policy can often develop
particular organizational culture and
structure. Chandler defines strategy as “the
determination of the basic goals and
objectives of an enterprise, and adoption of
the courses of action and the allocation of
resources necessary for carrying out these
goals.” 82 In the public sector, an agency’s
strategy can be articulated in its enabling
legislation that defines its purposes and by its
strategic plans, mission statements, policies,
and adopted goals. For example the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 states the
mission of the Department of Homeland
Security is to:
Prevent terrorist attacks within the United
States; reduce the vulnerability of the
United States to terrorism; minimize the
damage, and assist in the recovery, from
terrorist attacks that do occur within the
United States; and carry out all functions of
entities transferred to the Department,
including acting as a focal point regarding
natural and manmade crises and
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emergency planning. 83

After 9/11, the FBI also changed its
mission priorities and identified prevention
of terrorist attacks as its number one priority.
Both these examples illustrate how an
organization can change its structure to
accommodate a shift in policy, and strategy –
in this case, a greater emphasis on counterterrorism. Some have argued that this focus
on terrorism by DHS left the agency
unprepared for large-scale natural disasters
such as Hurricane Katrina. 84 The growing
number of natural disasters combined with
the increasing number of murders and drug
related violence on the US-Mexican border,
and the increasing threats to our cyber
infrastructure led to a significant change in
the mission of the Department of Homeland
Security. Under President Obama, DHS has
five homeland security missions: (1)
preventing terrorism and enhancing security;
(2) securing and managing borders; (3)
enforcing and administering immigration
laws; (4) safeguarding securing cyberspace;
and (5) ensuring resilience to disasters. 85
Strategy formulation and changes typically
begin with an assessment of the
opportunities and threats in the external
environment and is an on-going process for
government organizations such as DHS.
Organizational culture is very important to
organizations and culture change is a critical
component of organizational transformation.
Organizational culture is defined as “the set
of values, guiding beliefs, understandings and
ways of thinking that is shared by members
of an organization and taught to new
members as correct.” 86 Edgar Schein argued,
“Culture matters because it is a powerful,
latent, and often unconscious set of forces
that determine both our individual and
collective behavior, ways of perceiving,
thought patterns, and values.” 87 In turn,
cultural elements determine strategy, goals,
and modes of operating. For example,
because law enforcement agencies, such as
the FBI, perceive terrorism as a crime, their
counterterrorism strategies must be
underpinned by the guiding principle of the
rule of law and implemented through the
criminal justice approach.
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Understanding organizational cultures
helps to explain some of the interorganizational and intra-organizational
conflicts that occur in implementing policies
and programs in homeland security. A
conflict highlighted in the 9/11 Commission
Report was between the FBI and CIA in
sharing intelligence information on suspected
terrorists. An example of this conflict can be
illustrated in part by the drastically different
organizational cultures and strategies of the
intelligence community and the law
enforcement community.
The culture of intelligence-driven
organizations differs from those of pure law
enforcement organizations. 88 While (foreign)
intelligence organizations are interested in
long-term infiltration, active and passive
monitoring, and deterrence, 89 the law
enforcement bias is to arrest and prosecute.
Also, the primary goals of an intelligence
organization include principle elements in
the intelligence cycle such as: (1) determining
what intelligence should be collected to
advance national interests; (2) systematically
collecting that raw intelligence; (3) applying
analytical tools to the raw information in the
development of informed judgments; and (4)
sharing that finished intelligence with
national level policymakers and other
officials with a demonstrated need to know.
“Tradecraft” or the how, where, and why
intelligence gathering takes place, is of
utmost importance. 90 Recruitment of sources
and penetration of groups operating in the
United States is highly valued by intelligence
organizations. Finally, there are fewer legal
restrictions on overseas CIA operations than
FBI investigations at home or abroad.
By contrast, the primary goal of law
enforcement is to respond to criminal
activities, and to deter future crimes. In
general, this goal is achieved by rigorous
investigation of criminal activities and close
cooperation with prosecutors. Discrete,
individual criminal cases are the driving
factor in law enforcement organizations,
while broader trends and relationships
among social variables – such as political,
economic, and military factors – drive
intelligence organizations. 91 When law
enforcement entities operate within the
United States, civil liberties and the rights of
US citizens are of paramount concern. As a
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result, the FBI is governed by a complex
range of investigative guidelines and polices,
and statutes and constitutional limits when
intelligence is being gathered in the United
States against foreign agents or US citizens. 92
This lens not only focuses on the
organizations involved in homeland security
but also on the organizational structure of
terrorist groups.
Threats to homeland security come from
terrorist organizations or movements often in
the form of loosely linked networks of varied
groups. These groups can range from highly
organized and trained operatives (e.g., Ramzi
Yousef) to groups of potential actors who lack
training or stable organizational structures
(e.g., Black September). Today’s terrorist
networks are different than past terrorist
organizations in their design, technology, and
tactics and pose unique challenges. 93
Terrorism research often includes studies
on how terrorist organizations are structured
and how these structures have changed and
adapted to their environment. In the past, the
tendency was to assume that terrorists
belonged to identifiable organizations with
relatively clear command and control
structures (pyramid organization) and a
defined chain of command, as well as a
defined set of political, social, and economic
o b j e c t i v e s . 94 R e c e n t l y , t e r r o r i s t
organizational structures have evolved into
more loosely linked network structures to
survive in a constantly changing threat
environment with a distributed control and
command structure (if one exists at all). As
law enforcement, intelligence, and military
operations have successfully found and
captured operatives in terrorist
organizations, these groups have had to find
new ways to evade authority, to become more
adaptable and resilient, and to ensure their
organization would survive if the main
leaders were captured or killed. 95
Arquilla and Ronfeldt, in their study of
terrorist organizations, define a network as “a
set of diverse, dispersed nodes that share a
set of ideas and interests and are arrayed to
act in a fully intermitted networked
manner. 96 Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue that
these networks have little or no hierarchy or
official authority. 97 Also decision-making and
operations are decentralized; thus tactical
operations can be initiated and carried out
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locally without central leadership. 98 The
network organization often has a
decentralized cell structure consisting of a
small group of people and a team leader. The
leader is usually the person with the most
experience; he or she is responsible for
ensuring the tasks of the cell are carried out
and for communicating and coordinating
with other cells. Since 9/11, al Qaeda has
made numerous transformations and has

16

morphed into a multidimensional network of
networks. The challenge in homeland
security is in designing governance structures
and networks that are effective and efficient
at preventing, deterring, and responding to
terrorist attacks and other natural and
manmade hazards.
(See Table 3 for a
summary of this lens.)

Table 3: Characteristics of Lens III – Terrorism as a Network
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LENS IV – HOMELAND SECURITY AS A
COLLABORATIVE NEXUS OF NETWORKS,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS –
TERRORISM IS VIEWED AS A COMPLEX
MIXTURE OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS99
The previous discussion indicates that
homeland security may appear to function
differently depending on one’s viewpoint. It
follows that homeland security can
legitimately be “in the eye of the beholder;”
that is, homeland security means different
things to different people. Further, the
previous discussion indicates that the
policies, strategies, and even the tactics
employed in the ongoing struggle against
transnational, asymmetric terrorism would
be different when conceived and executed
through one lens as opposed to another.
Referring again to Figure 1, it becomes
apparent then that perhaps it makes sense to
investigate what the overlap in the three
lenses may mean; that is, that the overlap
itself is a separate lens with which to view
homeland security strategies, organization,
operations, or tactics. We will explore the
emergent construct of environmental security
as an exemplar of this lens.
Consistent with a multi-lens theory of
homeland security, we have described the
term “homeland security” as a construct that
tends to be dynamic (e.g., its meaning
changes over time), and is value-laden (e.g., it
can mean different things to different
constituents). Understanding that what is
and what is not homeland security is also
context dependent, enables it to be addressed
in a wide spectrum of levels of analysis
(ranging from individual to global/
transnational) and policy. In order to
properly frame the importance of global
climate and public health in a security
paradigm, there are several major forms or
frameworks of conceiving security that are
pertinent to consider. These include the
concepts of transnational, international, and
national security; homeland security;
environmental security; and human security.
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In 2010, Pakistan experienced its worst
flooding in a century, and Russia was plagued
with record heat and widespread wildfires
that choked the region with smoke and killed
hundreds. Both of these events were related,
and were potentially tied to climate change,
which may have contributed to an unusual
alteration in the high altitude jet stream. This
unusual phenomenon brought both the
devastating heat to Russia and helped push
large amounts of moisture-laden air into
Pakistan, where almost 20 percent of the
country was flooded. In addition, both the
record flooding in the American Midwest,
and second most deadly tornado season
(killing almost 500 people) occurred in 2011.
All of these events may eventually be tied in
part to global warming-related weather
pattern/climate changes, but regardless of
the causality of these specific events, these
are but a few of the types of extreme climactic
events that are predicted by climate change
models. What the field of environmental
security is primarily concerned about is the
relationship between global and regional
climates and how that influences cascading
failures in human and ecological systems.
Global warming and the resultant changes
to climate around the world are among the
biggest challenges humanity faces. As such,
policy makers and security strategists should
not consider global warming a distant or
abstract problem. Rather climate change/
global warming represent a challenge that all
nations need to participate in solving. And
taken together with various other related
challenges including peak oil (and related
energy resource pressures), growing water
and food shortages, and population growth,
transnational crime and asymmetric
insurgencies, combine to become a more
significant human security concern. 100 As
discussed below, governments and militaries
around the world, including the United States
Pentagon, have begun to recognize this
concern. For example, hunger is already a
rising global problem, reducing decades-long
improvements. This has been caused in part
by rising food and fuel prices, which will vary
but worsen overall with reduced oil and gas
supplies caused by “peak oil” production
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drops. Rising hunger has respectively been
the result of crop failures and water shortages
from climate change, and rising demand from
both population growth and rising demand
for high-quality, high-input foods like meat
(the latter related to rising wealth in
countries like India, Brazil and China). Many
food, water, and oil-stressed poorer nations
have reached political and social tipping
points that culminate in mass migrations or
social and political unrest which can
eventually lead to their governments failing
(e.g., failed states and large scale regional
disruptions such as the Arab Spring
uprisings).
As a part of the larger domain of
homeland security, the main goals of
environmental security (ES) include
stabilizing natural systems that ultimately
impact national security, including those
systems affected by global warming. Hence
the concept is that sustainable natural
systems lead to sustainable security. Hunger,
water and fuels shortages, and disease each
adds to the misery felt by society and to
political instability. Subsequently, political
instability tends to motivate radical acts,
terrorism, wars, and other political violence
and economic distress as we have recently
witnessed in the conflicts in northern Africa
and the Middle East. Therefore, ES
challenges traditional security concepts by its
focus on mitigation strategies such as (1)
building sustainable economic systems and
reducing population growth rates as much as
possible; (2) eliminating/reducing poverty
and enhancing education, which would help
stabilize population growth and build a
healthier and an employable population base;
(3) stabilizing and restoring Earth’s critical
environmental systems, such as forests, soil,
oceans and fisheries, and fresh water supplies
that will support future economic activity and
growth; (4) reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, to reverse the rising atmospheric
levels from their current, and future,
unsustainable levels; and (5) achieving
sustainable energy policies, including
improved energy efficiency (better use of
energy consumed) and alternative energy
sources (such as solar, wind, geothermal, biofuels, etc.) to replace the fossil fuel shortages
already looming.
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By its nature, environmental security
challenges certain traditional notions of
national security and homeland security. ES
must include many non-traditional security
players – including agencies such as the
Environment Protection Agency (EPA), the
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), and independent
and government scientists doing research on
climate change-related issues, technologies,
etc. Even some states, such as California,
have independently enacted climate securityrelated legislation to reduce GHG emissions
through regulation and tax incentives. 101 In
light of the intersection of global climate
change and the resulting impact on the
political economies and governments around
the world, we might define environmental
security as:
An interdisciplinary study of the affects of
extreme environmental or climatic events
which can act locally or trans-nationally to
destabilize countries or regions of the world
resulting in either geopolitical instability,
resource conflicts or vulnerabilities in
critical infrastructure, or some combination
of these.

The discussion above clearly points out
how environmental security exemplifies the
overlap of the international relations,
criminal justice, and networks lenses.
Recently the 2010 QDR recognized for the
first time the national security implications of
climate change and energy dependence by
stating:
The rising demand for resources, rapid
urbanization of littoral regions, the effects
of climate change, the emergence of new
strains of disease, and profound cultural
and demographic tensions in several
regions are just some of the trends whose
complex interplay may spark or exacerbate
future conflicts. 102

As an example of the QDR’s concerns,
consider the challenges peak oil represents to
US homeland security. Persistent access to
affordable fossil fuels like oil is not only core
to the ongoing health of the US economy, but
its success depends on effective international
policy networks, transnational law
enforcement structures, and international
relations. For instance, energy use/inputs in
the form of oil and gas-related products (e.g.,
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nitrogen fertilizers, fuel for farming),
machine production, and transportation of
food to distant markets have become central
to modern agriculture productivity and food
distribution. The rising price of oil is thought
to be caused, at least in part, by a
combination of the inevitable depletion of oil
and gas reserves (supply) and rising global
use of fossil fuels and transportation
(demand). Since food production in the
developed world is incredibly oil intensive, as
the price of oil increases, the price of food
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follows. Clearly a political concern in the
United States, rising food prices are
particularly traumatic for those in less
developed countries. Consequently, as food
becomes increasingly expensive, mass
migrations of populations seeking better
opportunities can be expected. Such
migrations become major stressors to the
economies and governments of both
receiving nations and to the nations who are
losing the skills and talents of their populace.

Table 4: Characteristics of Lens IV – Terrorism as a Collaborative Nexus

CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is to begin the
effort to build a theoretical foundation for
homeland security by creating a framework
based on four distinct conceptual lenses
developed from the academic literature in the
fields of criminology, international relations,
organization studies, risk management, and
public administration. These conceptual
lenses include (1) homeland security as a

criminal justice problem, with terrorism
viewed as crime; (2) homeland security as a
international relations problem, with
terrorism viewed as war; (3) homeland
Security as an organization design problem,
with terrorism viewed as a network of
transnational, sub-state actors; and (4)
homeland security as a collaborative nexus of
the law enforcement, diplomatic, and
network lenses that culminates in the notion
of environmental security. Each conceptual
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lens consists of theories, practices, values,
beliefs, and assumptions that can serve to
shape how critical events are perceived, and
as such, how these events are understood and
the problems addressed in the form of
homeland security programs and policies.
The fields of criminology, organization
theory, public administration, and
international relations each bring unique
theoretical perspectives that contribute
significantly to our understanding of
homeland security, but none of the lenses
individually provides an adequate picture of
the challenges of homeland security theory or
policies needed to address modern threats
and hazards.
Homeland security is a complex problem
that spans many academic disciplines,
professions, and organizational boundaries.
It encompasses both foreign and domestic
policy issues, and involves government
organizations at all levels, as well as
businesses, nonprofit organizations, and
citizens. In fact, homeland security is so
complex that multiple perspectives are
needed to analyze the phenomenon because
one perspective simply misses too much, or
fails to see critical pieces of the problem that
need to be addressed. Thus, further research
should be encouraged that is interdisciplinary
and seeks to break down some of the
disciplinary barriers within the field of
homeland security. This requires a focus on
processes and incentives that will bring
scholars and policymakers with these
different perspectives together.
It is clear that conceptual lenses heavily
influence whether we will be aware of new
problems, how we give meaning to what we
observe, and how we perceive or understand
new phenomenon. Unexpected changes are
often difficult to perceive, let alone address
because they simply are not captured within
our mental maps or conceptual lenses that we
use to make sense of the world. To ensure we
are not surprised by another 9/11, it is critical
that we continue to broaden our conceptual
lenses as it relates to homeland security.
In the rapidly changing environment of
the information age, problems are constantly
morphing into new forms, thus the life cycle
of any particular solution is likely to be very
short. Thus, an important challenge for
scholars and government leaders is to lead

20

the process of continuing to analyze our
existing conceptual lenses as they relate to
homeland security, as well as to lead the
process of constructing new conceptual
lenses. A useful next step would be to apply
the lenses to a number of terrorist attacks
and conduct a multiple case study. Multiple
frame analysis can be used to analyze critical
cases such as the attacks on the World Trade
Center in 1993 and 2001. A comparative
analysis of these two events can be conducted
to see how our conceptual lenses and
perceptions have changed over time. In
addition, further research is needed on the
lenses used in multiple frame analysis in
order to more clearly define the theories,
concepts, definitions, and principles in each.
Also, additional lenses can be added to the
framework such as those that look at
homeland security from an emergency
management, public health, or risk
management perspective and applied to other
cases. Also, further research is needed to
understand how these conceptual lenses are
formed and shared, and changed within
government organizations, as well as among
elected officials. The use of multiple lenses in
analyzing complex phenomenon such as
homeland security is important because
when used alone, one perspective or lens can
miss key elements and captures only a small
part of the phenomenon we are observing.
Using multiple perspectives allows us to
develop explanations that help us understand
specific aspects of homeland security as well
as identify alternative paradigms that serve to
help transform our theories, traditions, rules,
and standards of practice.
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